Why we must not gamble away biodiversity on speculative and risky synthetic biology

Eva Sirinathsinghji, Third World Network

The synthetic biology field is still largely confined to the research and development phase. It is not yet deployed at scale, particularly with regard to environmental release applications. Yet industry promises are increasingly broad-ranging and speculative: from widely debunked ‘de-extinction’ conservation projects, to ‘predictive’ targeting of self-limiting engineered insects to single neighbourhoods, hospitality venues or military installations, to ‘safely’ releasing living modified microbes despite the lack of any proven ability to control their capacity for survival, transboundary spread or evolutionary adaptation.

A field associated with strong commercial interests and hype warrants careful scrutiny over which are the most viable, locally appropriate and less risky approaches for protecting biodiversity and human well-being. Crucially, its relevance to the Convention and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, both positive and negative, needs to be carefully assessed.

As such, the thematic action plan to support capacity-building, technology transfer and knowledge sharing in the context of synthetic biology needs to be rooted in sovereignty, precaution and equity. It is critical that developing countries’ capacities are built for independent and sovereign assessment, governance and regulation of synthetic biology. This will ensure that they are robustly equipped to make sovereign decisions on synthetic biology applications and development trajectories, while not left bearing the burden of risk management, clean up, liability and costs associated with any damages or technology failures.

Moreover, equitable participation in research and development in the field should not automatically equate to an enabling environment for the deployment of synthetic biology applications that remain unproven and largely experimental. Research collaborations and capacity-building efforts should also be independent and free of conflicts of interest, so that such efforts are not driven by profit incentives.

Anticipatory and timely horizon-scanning and monitoring can also assist Parties in staying abreast of novel developments within the field. This can allow for effective oversight to assess safety, suitability and efficacy of novel technologies, including biosafety, socio-economic, cultural and ethical dimensions.

The draft decision on synthetic biology should therefore:

  • Focus the thematic action plan on the assessment, governance and regulation of synthetic biology, especially for developing countries.

  • Re-emphasise the need for a process that is flexible and forward looking with respect to future developments, with anticipatory horizon-scanning and monitoring mechanisms for timely identification and assessment of potential positive and potential negative impacts, in line with a precautionary approach.

  • Ensure that assessment is on a multidiscipli-nary and inclusive basis to contribute to participatory decision-making, in accordance with the precautionary approach and national prio-rities and circumstances, and in consultation with indigenous peoples and local communities, women and youth, with their free, prior and informed consent.

  • Keep research and capacity-building initiatives free of profit-driven conflicts of interest and extend the procedure for avoiding or managing conflicts of interests in expert groups to consultants.