LMO

Biodiversity is declining at unprecedented rates, driven by human activity that erodes the very foundations of life on Earth. Yet while extinction accelerates, a new trend is emerging: proposals to genetically engineer nature itself. These include eradicating mosquito, mouse or rabbit populations, altering invasive species, making endangered animals disease-resistant, and even reviving extinct creatures like the mammoth or the dire wolf. None has yet succeeded, but the ecological and ethical risks are immense.

The release of genetically engineered organisms into natural ecosystems carries irreversible consequences. Once released, they cannot be recalled. Their interactions with other species are unpredictable, and they could permanently disrupt already fragile ecological networks. The science of ecosystem interactions remains too incomplete to allow confident manipulation, becoming even more unpredictable by the effects of climate change. Moreover, the current biosafety frameworks—designed for crops and livestock—are wholly inadequate for the complexities of wild systems. There are no effective international mechanisms to address cross-border liability or damage.

Another grave concern is that genetic engineering of wild species alters the spiritual, cultural, and ecological connections of Indigenous Peoples’ and Local Communities’ with the ecosystems in their territories, thereby undermining their rights.

Introducing genetic engineering into conservation marks a paradigm shift: from protecting nature for its intrinsic value to redesigning it according to human preferences. Framed as “just another tool,” it risks transforming conservation from safeguarding life to engineering it.

A responsible path forward requires a moratorium—no environmental releases of genetically engineered wild species, not even experimental ones—until science can reliably predict outcomes, strong regulatory systems and global frameworks exist, Indigenous rights are fully respected, and societies have reached broad consensus on ethical boundaries.

Moratoria are not new. They have long been used to prevent irreversible harm, including IUCN’s moratoriums on deep-sea mining and destructive fisheries. Applying the same precautionary logic to genetic engineering of wild species is a vital step to uphold the Precautionary Principle and the intrinsic value of biodiversity.

This need for restraint was recognised in IUCN Motion 133, brought to the IUCN World Conservation Congress in 2025. The motion called for a “precautionary deferment of the release of genetically engineered wild organisms into natural ecosystems.” Although 55% of all members supported it, the motion ultimately failed because the IUCN requires approval from both a majority of organisational members and of government members. Motion 133 fell short of the latter by a single government vote — a narrow margin with far-reaching implications.

It is up to the CBD now to protect against the negative impacts of engineering nature.

More information at https://engineeringnature.org/

Synthetic biology, drawing on engineering metaphors, has built a vision of “biology by design.” Some practitioners warn that it is often framed as offering “easy solutions to difficult problems” or even as “the one technical solution to many grave world problems.” Engineered gene drives (EGD) for example have attracted considerable attention and funding by promising such simple solutions. The question is whether the science supports these claims.

The ambition: altering nature’s inheritance. Gene drives are designed to bias inheritance so that a chosen genetic trait spreads rapidly through a population — even if it harms the organism. The ambition is to use this mechanism to suppress or eliminate wild species seen as problematic, such as disease-carrying mosquitoes or invasive rodents. But if released, these systems could persist and spread uncontrollably, posing serious ecological risks. Before debating governance, it is worth asking: can they deliver on their promises?

Hype: suggesting readiness that does not exist. One high-profile proposal is to use a “tCRISPR” gene drive to eradicate invasive mice by spreading female infertility. The abstract of the study implies this goal is achievable, but the gene-drive mice used for modeling differ from those actually used in experiments,. It only works in laboratory mice already engineered to express Cas9, meaning it would not function in wild populations. A proof of principle is lacking. Even if such proof were reached, its behavior in nature would remain uncertain due to issues such as drive resistance and mating patterns.

Hype: promising control without proof. Concerns about gene drives spreading uncontrollably are often met with assurances that they can be “localized” or “confined.” “Daisy drives” have been widely cited as the solution, supposedly allowing local control. Yet despite major investment, there is no evidence that a functional daisy drive exists beyond computer models. These assurances rest on hypothetical mechanisms rather than demonstrated technologies.

Hype: overstating novelty by dismissing existing tools. There is a tendency to portray existing control measures as ineffective. A recent gene-drive announcement claimed malaria control had “stalled,” whereas the World Health Organization highlights continuing progress and points to social and funding challenges. This selective framing risks undermining established, proven methods.

Beyond the hype. Promotional terms such as innovative, powerful, and scalable are common in synthetic biology, but assessing real potential requires separating speculation from evidence. As Caulfield notes, the competitive nature of research encourages exaggeration and premature optimism. For gene drives, this means recognizing that what is promised is still far from proven. Whether or not gene drives eventually work, decision-making must be guided by evidence, not hype.

Read the full report Will genedrives work? Cutting through the hype in synthetic biology  on genedrivemonitor.org

The biotechnology industry is expanding into riskier domains, broadening the potential species range, trait type, and applications. These new LMOs pose heightened risks due to their potential for uncontrollable spread, persistence, reproductive capability, and unknown ecological impacts. Knowledge gaps about their biology and interactions with ecosystems make thorough risk assessment difficult, especially regarding transboundary movement and the rights of potentially affected communities to free, prior and informed consent.

In response, the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on Risk Assessment has recommended developing further guidance materials in four key areas: LM microorganisms, LM algae, LM fish, and LMOs expressing genome editing machinery for pest or pathogen control. These recommendations should be supported as further guidance is necessary to address the biosafety challenges posed by these applications.

Furthermore, first-generation LM crops continue to threaten food sovereignty and genetic diversity, especially in centres of origin and traditional agricultural systems. As more products including those with genetically stacked traits enter the food supply, long-term and cumulative effects become more pressing concerns. Thus, the development of technical notes on these two topics, as recommended by the AHTEG, would be useful.

The process of developing any further guidance materials needs to be alert to industry attempts to narrow and weaken risk assessments. The guidance materials should be grounded in the precautionary principle and Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol, ensuring comprehensive evaluation of unintended effects. The Protocol must remain a robust regulatory tool—not a formality for approving risky technologies.